Key Highlights
- Iran's actions have disrupted a significant portion of global oil supply.
- Convoys through the Strait of Hormuz offer limited protection due to Iran's extended threat envelope.
- Mines pose a significant challenge, raising uncertainty and slowing down naval operations.
- Naval capacity for convoy missions has diminished since the 1980s.
- Protecting tankers requires a broader strategy beyond traditional convoys, involving destroyers and aircraft.
The ongoing Israeli-US war on Iran has triggered retaliatory actions from Tehran, significantly impacting global oil supply. Experts suggest that a regional effort, extending beyond current proposals, is necessary to untangle this disruption.
President Donald Trump has advocated for global powers to send warships to escort tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for oil and liquefied natural gas. However, Iran has demonstrated an ability to disrupt supplies throughout the Persian Gulf and beyond using drones and missiles.
Trump acknowledged the ease with which Iran can launch attacks, stating, “It’s easy for them to send a drone or two, drop a mine, or deliver a close-range missile somewhere along, or in, this Waterway, no matter how badly defeated they are.”
Strait of Hormuz Security Challenges
Strategic planners must consider a wider geographical area and a broader array of tools to protect oil tankers. Naval analyst Tayfun Ozberk noted that treating "Hormuz security" solely as a chokepoint problem is analytically incomplete.
The Strait of Hormuz narrows to approximately 24 miles (38 kilometers), increasing vulnerability during the transit phase. Ozberk explained that traffic is exposed not only during the brief transit but also during the longer 'funnelling' phase where routes and speed constraints are predictable.
Iran has conducted attacks on shipping hundreds of miles from the strait, impacting areas towards the Iraqi coast and into the Gulf of Oman. A European military source indicated that risks persist as long as vessels are within missile range.
Even within the strait, the narrowness of the channel limits the time available for warships to intercept attacks. Researchers Christian Bueger and Jane Chan stated in a paper for RSIS that navy-escorted convoys offer limited protection and require capabilities for air defence, intercepting speed boats and drones, and detecting mines.
This situation echoes the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, where commercial ships in the strait were targeted. Sidharth Kaushal of the UK-based RUSI think tank noted that the United States required up to 35 vessels during the Tanker War.
However, the capacity of navies to conduct such operations has decreased. Hans Tino Hansen of Risk Intelligence reported that the number of Western warships equipped for convoy missions has fallen by 75 percent since 1988.
Mine Threats and Broader Strategies
Sea mines present a particularly difficult challenge for convoys. Trump mentioned that US forces had hit Iran’s mine-laying ships, but warned that devices could be transferred to other vessels.
Ozberk described mines as Iran’s “most strategically efficient lever” because they “raise uncertainty and cost even when they don’t sink ships.” He emphasized that a credible mine threat cannot be circumvented by convoys without mine countermeasures.
Implementing mine countermeasures slows down convoys, as specialist vessels require time to clear devices and need their own protection. A mine countermeasure vessel must precede any convoy to detect anomalies, and frigates are needed within the convoy to address air and surface threats.
Kaushal suggested that protecting tankers in the wider region might not resemble traditional convoys. Instead, destroyers and aircraft could establish an air-defence network over routes, while helicopters might provide cover against surface drones.
The tempo of activity required to maintain this shield and simultaneously engage targets on the Iranian mainland would likely be highly resource-intensive.




